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CHINA IN AFRICA
An AFRICOM Response
Commander Todd A. Hofstedt, U.S. Navy
The recent expansion of Chinese activity in Africa has raised several concerns,ranging from control over energy resources to exploitive economic practices
and support of rogue or corrupt regimes, perpetuating instability and under-
mining international pressure for reform. These issues, however, represent only
a fraction of China’s broadly based engagement in Africa. In fact, the most egre-
gious examples of China’s behavior commonly cited are unsustainable and even
counterproductive to its long-term interests in Africa. China’s involvement is
thus evolving, as government and ever more influential business interests in that
nation recognize the advantages of political and economic stability in Africa.
These interests support U.S. security objectives in Africa, encouraging more ef-
fective governance and mitigating grievances against the status quo. Conse-
quently, in the furtherance of its mission “to promote a stable and secure African
environment,” the newly established U.S. Africa Com-
mand (AFRICOM) would do well to support the pro-
ductive, responsible activities of Chinese actors in
Africa.1
In its inaugural white paper on Africa, China’s Afri-
can Policy, issued in January 2006, China identified its
“general principles and objectives” as “Sincerity,
friendship and equality”; “Mutual benefit, reciprocity
and common prosperity”; “Mutual support and close
coordination”; “Learning from each other and seek-
ing common development”; and “The one-China
principle . . . [as] the political foundation for the
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establishment and development of China’s relations with African countries.”2
The somewhat nebulous nature of these “objectives” (with the exception of the
One-China principle) and the fact that they were intended for an international
audience necessitate the examination of China’s actual activities with respect to
Africa in order to assess the practical meaning of these objectives and the degree
to which they have been achieved.
CHINA’S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
Chinese involvement in Africa is broad both geographically and in nature. Of the
fifty-three countries in Africa, China maintains official diplomatic relations with
all but Burkina Faso, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gambia, and Swaziland, which
maintain official relations with Taiwan.3 Those four states excepted, China has an
embassy and ambassador in each of the African nations but Somalia (due to secu-
rity issues), and all except Comoros maintain embassies in Beijing.4 Moreover, of-
ficial contacts include frequent high-level visits by President Hu Jintao, Premier
Wen Jiabao, and numerous ministers, particularly the foreign minister, whose first
foreign visit each year since 1991 has been to Africa.5 In a November 2006 summit
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China hosted political
leaders from forty-eight African states, including forty-one heads of state or gov-
ernment.6 (Founded in 2000, the FOCAC meets annually, with summit-level talks
every three years.)7 China is also actively engaged with the African Union (AU),
pledging $100–$150 million for the construction of a permanent headquarters
and attending AU summits in 2006 and 2007.8 The chairperson of the Commis-
sion of the African Union, Jean Ping, commended China in January 2009 for its
contributions to Africa and identified China as Africa’s key strategic partner.9 In
February 2009, China dramatically broadened its diplomatic support for Africa at
a plenary session of the UN General Assembly, during which the Chinese ambas-
sador declared: “In the reform of the Security Council, priority should be given to
the greater representation of developing countries, in particular African ones.”10
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of Chinese activity in Africa is eco-
nomic. China has provided considerable development aid, in the form of
low-interest loans, including thirteen billion dollars to Angola, nine billion to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and $2.5 billion to Ethiopia.11 This is on
top of 10.5 billion yuan ($1.3 billion) in debt relief provided to twenty-seven Af-
rican countries between 2000 and 2003 and an additional ten billion yuan in
debt cancellation for thirty-three African countries announced in 2006.12 China
also contributes to the African Development Bank, hosting the bank’s annual
meeting in May 2007, in Shanghai.13 Additionally, China is a member of the
West African Development Bank, has signed agreements with the East African
Development Bank and with the Eastern and Southern African Trade and
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Development Bank, and is engaging the Economic Community of West African
States, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the South Af-
rican Development Community.14
China-Africa trade in recent years has grown dramatically, from forty billion
dollars in 2005 and $55.5 billion in 2006 to seventy billion in 2007 (when China,
overtaking Britain and France, became Africa’s second-largest trading partner)
and an anticipated excess of $100 billion in 2010, at which point it would surpass
the United States to become Africa’s single largest trading partner.15 In fact, this
target was achieved two years early, with trade in 2008 reaching $106.8 billion,
despite trade actually declining in December as the global financial crisis inten-
sified.16 This is particularly noteworthy given that the rate of Africa’s export
growth to China (exceeding an average of 40 percent annually) and import
growth from China (exceeding an average of 35 percent annually) are both con-
siderably higher than the rate of growth in either world trade (14 percent) or
commodity prices (18 percent).17 China’s balance of trade with Africa has
shifted from a surplus of $940 million in 2007 to a deficit of $5.16 billion in
2008.18 China has expanded the list of duty-free imports from Africa from 190 to
440 items and is discussing a free-trade agreement with the Southern Africa
Customs Union.19 Trade relations are further fostered by “commercial counselor
offices in 40 African countries and seven consulates-general in five of them.”20
Despite the common perception of Chinese exploitation of African natural re-
sources, Chinese trade is actually no more exploitive than that with the West:
“The similar composition of goods traded between Africa and its main trading
partners suggests that the recent surge in Africa-China trade largely reflects the
comparative advantages of each partner, given their stage of economic develop-
ment, rather than any unilateral interest by China in exploiting natural
resources.”21
While still relatively small, Chinese direct investment in Africa is growing and
diversifying. Though published values vary considerably, as late as 2007 China
had invested, by one measure, thirteen billion dollars in Africa, primarily in ex-
tractive industries, about six billion of that in the oil sector of Sudan alone.22 In
October of that year, however, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
purchased a $5.6 billion stake (representing 20 percent) in the Standard Bank
Group of South Africa, Africa’s largest bank.23 By 2005 China had established
over eight hundred enterprises in Africa, and in 2006 it announced plans for a
five-billion-dollar China-Africa Development Fund to promote African invest-
ment by Chinese firms.24 Additionally, “special economic zones” have been cre-
ated to provide Chinese firms preferential “incentives, tax breaks, and reliable
power services to mitigate investment risk” and to “link disparate and frag-
mented African producers and markets in China.”25
3
Hofstedt: China in Africa
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
8 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Though frequently criticized in the West, Chinese economic aid is very popu-
lar in Africa, since its unconditionality (the sole prerequisite being acceptance of
the One-China principle) respects sovereignty, in regional eyes, and avoids the
protracted negotiation process that, in contrast, can significantly delay the re-
ceipt of aid from the West.26 Africa thus sees China as a valuable alternative to
the West, whose aid it also perceives as frequently paternalistic and as tending to
impose Western values.27 Moreover, Nigerian officials, for example, despite “cer-
tain reservations about Chinese intentions,” have noted that “collaboration with
the West . . . had left Africa impoverished despite half a century of aid.”28 China
also funds high-profile projects that provide tangible benefits, including proj-
ects eschewed by Western donors for their difficulty.29
In particular, Chinese, like African, leaders generally favor infrastructure
projects, while Western donors prefer to avoid them.30 Chinese firms complete
them less expensively than their Western counterparts and have a reputation
for rapid completion and acceptable (if not Western-level) quality.31 Chinese
firms have also proved more tolerant of financial and security risk, going into
areas of conflict and instability generally avoided by Western companies,
thereby facilitating a greater range of operations.32 Technology transfer from
these projects is generally more readily exploitable for African users as well,
since their technological gap with respect to China is much smaller than that
with the West.33 Finally, a number of Chinese companies are electing to remain
in Africa after the initial projects that brought them there have been com-
pleted, indicating their perception of ongoing economic opportunity and
making them readily available for follow-on projects.34
The current global economic crisis and its concomitant decline in commod-
ity prices have raised questions about the future direction of Chinese economic
involvement in Africa. Some observers believe an economic retrenchment—if
not retreat—is under way, citing the fact that in the last two months of 2008,
over sixty Chinese mining firms departed the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and more than a hundred left Zambia.35 They also point to the in-
activity associated with the 2007 offer of several billion dollars in loans to the
DRC, the repayment of which was to be partially based on copper-mining con-
cessions.36 Resource-based loans to Guinea and Gabon are experiencing similar
delays.37
A broader view, however, discredits this conclusion. First of all, the possible
waning of Chinese interest is not the only factor impeding the DRC loan pack-
age; Western donors have threatened to withhold relief from the DRC’s
eleven-billion-dollar foreign debt if the DRC does not renegotiate the terms of
the Chinese financing.38 In the case of Guinea, the December 2008 coup and its
4
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associated political instability undoubtedly created concerns about both the
physical security of Chinese investment and, more fundamentally, whether
agreements with the current sitting government will have lasting economic and
diplomatic value.39 Second, though many small private Chinese mining firms
are leaving Africa, large state-owned mining firms are expanding in Africa to
take advantage of the low commodity prices.40 “Mining executives say that with
no need to answer to shareholders, many state-backed companies can take a
long-term view on the country’s demand for metals.”41 Examples include
Jinchuan, which has acquired a nickel mine in Zambia; the China Non-Ferrous
Metals Corporation, which is opening a copper-smelting plant in Zambia; and
China Union, which has signed a contract to mine iron in Liberia.42 Third, Presi-
dent Hu personally visited Africa as recently as February 2009, meeting with
leaders in Mali, Tanzania, Senegal, and Mauritius.43 This trip followed January
visits by China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, to Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi, and
South Africa, and the commerce minister, Chen Deming, to Kenya, Angola, and
Zambia.44 Finally, China has affirmed that despite the global economic crisis, it
will fully satisfy all commitments it made at the 2006 FOCAC.45 Additionally, in
just the first two months of 2009, China announced agreements with thirteen
African countries totaling over $15.9 billion in new loans and grants.46
Beyond these burgeoning financial relationships, China is expanding its
training and educational assistance to Africa, of which there is a long history;
such aid almost doubled in the 1990s.47 China maintains educational relation-
ships with fifty African countries and convened a Sino-African Education Min-
ister Forum in 2005.48 More African students now attend school in China than
ever before (5,900 in 2007), most on Chinese-government-provided scholar-
ships.49 China has pledged to “double the number of such scholarships by 2011,”
“build 100 rural schools in Africa by 2009,” and “establish 10 agricultural tech-
nology centers.”50 Between 2000 and 2003 China trained six thousand African
professionals in such fields as agriculture, medicine, engineering, and educa-
tion, and from 2004 through 2006 China claims to have trained 14,600 more.51
In addition to providing training, the Chinese Ministry of Health is develop-
ing “a long-term Chinese health strategy for Africa,” one that includes “collabo-
ration with the international community.”52 Approximately a thousand Chinese
medical professionals (over half of them senior physicians or surgeons) are cur-
rently working in thirty-eight African countries.53 At FOCAC in 2006 China
pledged, by 2009, to “build 30 hospitals . . . [and] provide about $40 million in
grants for anti-malarial drugs, prevention, and construction of model treatment
centers.”54 Having already constructed a number of hospitals in Africa, China is
planning to build ten more, as well as thirty malaria clinics, in the next three
years.55
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China’s political presence in Africa is also growing but is in many ways less
pervasive and less sophisticated than its economic presence. The International
Department of the Communist Party of China maintains relationships “al-
most exclusively with ruling parties in one-party dominated states,” eschewing
with few exceptions (most notably South Africa’s Democratic Alliance) inter-
action with “opposition parties for fear it will disturb its relationship with the
government in power.”56 China has established four Confucius Institutes in Af-
rica (with eight more to be completed soon), to teach the Chinese language,
history, and culture, and to “promote an understanding of its view of the
world.”57 Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, maintains offices across Af-
rica, not only to report news but to gather information for the government.58
Xinhua also trains African journalists, both in Africa and in China; a recent
two-week seminar in China drew more than forty attendees from thirty Afri-
can states.59 A specialized China African News Service was launched by Xinhua
in December 2007.60 Interestingly, the Chinese press center distributed at the
November 2006 FOCAC the book China and Africa 1956–2006, which presents
democracy “as a scourge because it ‘exacerbates’ tensions inside African coun-
tries”; “Fortunately,” the work observes, “the wave of democratization has
started weakening.”61
By comparison to both the economic and political, China’s military ties in Af-
rica are rather underdeveloped and static. Though China maintains security re-
lationships, of some sort, with all forty-nine African countries with which it
maintains diplomatic relations, it stations only between nine and fourteen mili-
tary attachés in Africa and has never conducted a joint military exercise with an
African state.62 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has, however, trained mili-
tary personnel from at least eighteen African countries and established ex-
change agreements with twenty-five.63 Almost 1,500 Chinese military personnel
(primarily observers, engineers, police, and medical and transportation person-
nel) support seven of the eight United Nations peacekeeping operations in Af-
rica, exceeding those of any other permanent member of the UN Security
Council.64 Some have criticized China’s failure to provide substantial combat
forces for actual peacekeeping, but deployment of support personnel may reflect
a conscious policy to demonstrate support for Africa without appearing mili-
tarily threatening.65 Furthermore, the emphasis on engineering and medical as-
sistance is consistent with aspects of China’s economic involvement. China also
provides financial support to the African Union to support peacekeeping in
Darfur and Somalia.66
China ranked third in arms exports to Africa from 2003 to 2006, behind Ger-
many and Russia, providing approximately 15.4 percent ($500 million) of total
sales to the continent.67 Though relatively small in magnitude, the destinations
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of arms shipments have drawn international criticism. China has become not
only Zimbabwe’s leading arms supplier but its second-largest trading partner.68
With Zimbabwe under sanctions by both the United States and European Union
(EU), China sold it fighter aircraft, air-defense systems, military vehicles, radio
jamming equipment, and electronic surveillance gear.69 In the case of Sudan,
Chinese assistance in establishing three weapons factories has undermined the
effectiveness of a UN arms embargo.70 China also provided arms to both sides in
conflicts between (and within) Ethiopia and Eritrea.71
The expansiveness of this activity appears consistent with the objectives
stated in China’s Africa Policy, though the broad wording of that document
could be interpreted as encompassing virtually anything. Although there are few
consistent themes from which to infer more precise intentions, the diversity of
the engagement is in itself suggestive and, taken together with what few themes
there are, indicates at least some of the specific objectives being promoted in
Africa.
CHINESE OBJECTIVES
From these diverse activities, then, a handful of fairly concrete objectives in Af-
rica can be deduced: ensuring access to natural resources, expanding export
markets, enhancing China’s prestige as a rising global power, and protecting its
international freedom of action.72 These theater-level strategic objectives sup-
port China’s national strategic objectives, which in turn are driven by a domestic
political need for economic growth and social stability:
Economic development rather than military supremacy is the primary objective for
China’s international engagement for a host of reasons—not the least of which are to
raise the living standards of its enormous population, to dampen social disaffection
about economic and other inequities, and to sustain regime legitimacy after the de-
mise of communist ideology as an acceptable organizing principle.73
Rapidly expanding Chinese interest in African natural resources, particularly
oil, has driven much of the recent international concern regarding China’s activ-
ities in Africa. China currently imports one-third of its oil from Africa; Angola
now surpasses even Saudi Arabia as China’s leading supplier.74 However, despite
this considerable growth, China still only imports 9 percent of Africa’s total oil
production, compared to 33 percent exported to Europe and 32 percent to the
United States.75 Also, China’s per capita oil consumption is only 7.4 percent of
that of the United States, though economic growth in China will certainly drive
significantly higher consumption over time.76 Most of the worry about Chinese
acquisition of sources of supply appears to ignore the fact that China’s tremen-
dous economic growth, coupled with its massive foreign currency reserves, will
H O F S T E D T 8 5
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put it in an increasingly better position than virtually any other country to buy
oil on the world market, whatever the ownership of the source. Nevertheless,
“Beijing would like to secure this supply through ownership and investments,
partly to avoid the price and supply uncertainty associated with buying such
commodities on spot markets. These resources are deemed critical for Beijing to
maintain the country’s economic growth.”77 Moreover, unless China exhibits
some elasticity of demand—that is, unless assurance of access alters consump-
tion—Chinese use of oil from national investments overseas would reduce de-
mand on global markets by an equivalent amount, yielding no net change. To
the extent that China opens new sources of oil (such as in Sudan), global sup-
plies actually increase. Most telling, perhaps, is the observation that “although
approximately half of China’s equity oil production worldwide comes from Af-
rica . . . , the majority of that equity production is not shipped to China but sold
on the world market.”78
The comprehensive Chinese approach to economic development in Africa,
focusing on infrastructure and increased diversification and encompassing
training, education, and medical care, strongly suggests a balanced and
long-term approach to promoting African economic growth. This is consistent
with recognition that considerable growth in African economies over an ex-
tended period of time will be required if Africa is to overcome its tremendous
poverty and generate the economic resources necessary for a substantial
long-term Chinese export market. Whether this ongoing expansion into new
markets is driven by a saturation of Chinese domestic markets or merely by the
desire to supplement them is a subject of debate, but in either case the ability of
expanded exports to foster economic growth while generating foreign currency
reserves remains unquestioned.79 In this manner, not only is economic growth
supported (both current and long-term), but future access to the natural re-
sources required for sustained performance is facilitated as well.
Manifestations of China’s aspirations for global prestige take many forms,
but perhaps the most obvious is the consistent demand that the People’s Repub-
lic of China be accepted as the one and only China, of which Taiwan is only a
subordinate province. This sole condition is imposed on virtually all diplomatic
and economic relations between China and the countries of Africa, and it has
proved remarkably effective: currently only four African countries recognize
Taiwan, down from over twenty in the early 1990s.80 Economically, China’s em-
phasis on high-visibility projects not only ingratiates itself with African leaders
but also culminates in lasting public testaments to Chinese largess and engineer-
ing prowess.81 “If the growth in its power is to proceed unhampered over time,
China will have to make its presence felt beyond its immediate environs.”82
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If it is true that “to the extent that China may exploit its soft power for strate-
gic ends, it is to forestall possible ‘containment’ rather than to pursue expan-
sion,” ensuring freedom of action can be seen as fundamentally linked to China’s
myriad activities in Africa.83 Strategically, legal ownership over sources of widely
traded global commodities is largely irrelevant to a country able to outbid virtu-
ally any competitor in the global marketplace—unless a hostile international
community colluded to impose mechanisms restricting sales to China. Simi-
larly, aggressive expansion and development of export markets in Africa tend to
forestall a catastrophic loss of trade should the West for any reason collectively
elect to restrict Chinese trade.
In pursuit of sustainable economic development, China also is seen to have placed a
priority in keeping stable and relatively tension-free relations with its primary export
market, the United States, and with other countries and regions. . . . [E]ven the ap-
pearance of a more overt pursuit of its regional and global interests could prompt the
United States and other countries to strengthen their alliances or form other group-
ings to counterbalance and deter China’s international outreach. Such a development
in turn could fetter China’s economic growth.84
In addition to protecting crucial elements of sustained economic growth,
freedom of action is also intrinsic to the other perceived prerequisite to the con-
tinued rule of the Communist Party of China: its ability to impose social order
domestically. This implies an international community in which national sover-
eignty is accepted as preempting international standards of human rights. Ac-
cording to China’s African Policy, China would, for African states accepting the
One-China principle, “coordinate positions on major international and re-
gional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and human rights.”85 Such a
policy has manifested itself through Chinese activity in the UN Security Council
in support of Sudan and Zimbabwe.86 Since African states constitute over
one-fourth of the UN General Assembly, courting their favor can yield substan-
tial international clout, and it has already proved advantageous to China: “Afri-
can states have been pivotal in preventing Taiwan from joining the World Health
Organization and in tabling a condemnation of Chinese human rights practices
at the U.N.’s Commission on Human Rights.”87
The current global economic crisis raises questions about the sustainability
of Chinese engagement in Africa. In the event of prolonged global economic
stagnation, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will likely experience increas-
ing pressure to redirect resources from African development to domestic devel-
opment so as to assuage discontent stemming from rising unemployment and
stalled improvement in living standards. However, while segments of the
H O F S T E D T 8 7
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Chinese population may resent the continued provision of foreign aid during a
period of domestic need, the CCP will likely resist any major reductions, as it ap-
pears to recognize that its diplomatic clout will contribute to Chinese influence
in shaping the eventual postcrisis global economic framework. In a February
2009 speech delivered in Tanzania, President Hu announced his desire to
“deepen cooperation with African countries in such multilateral organizations
as the UN and the World Trade Organization to address global challenges like
climate change, food security, poverty alleviation and development. We also
hope to participate jointly with them in developing international economic, fi-
nancial and trade rules and pushing forward the international economic order
in a fair and just manner.”88 Realizing this ambition would support, at least to
some extent, all four of China’s objectives in Africa.
Viewing Chinese activities in Africa in terms of these four principal objectives
provides a useful framework within which to devise an appropriate theater-level
response. However, inconsistencies between the long-term consequences of some
actions and the objectives being sought become immediately apparent and re-
quire consideration.
COMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
Though seemingly in the ascendant, China’s pursuit of its objectives in Africa
has become increasingly problematic, in that many of its activities are under-
mining achievement of its own long-term objectives. Several Chinese economic
practices, for example, are significantly degrading China’s popularity and
threatening its long-term economic access. Heavy reliance on imported Chinese
labor despite generally high unemployment among indigenous populations has
drawn widespread criticism. Also, Chinese indifference to workers’ rights does
little to encourage recruiting or retention and instead has led to several highly
publicized incidents.89 In September 2002, a fire at a Chinese-owned factory in
Nigeria killed at least thirty-seven Nigerians “after a factory foreman reportedly
locked the building doors”; in early 2008, striking Chinese workers clashed with
police in Equatorial Guinea, resulting in two deaths and several injuries.90 An
explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine in Zambia in April 2005 killed over
fifty people and led to demonstrations amid accusations that safety regulations
had been ignored.91 Anti-Chinese sentiment in that country reached such a level
that opposition to the Chinese presence became the primary issue in the opposi-
tion campaign for the presidency in September 2006; five months later, Presi-
dent Hu “was forced to abandon plans to visit the ‘Copper Belt’ due to fears that
the workers would revolt again.”92
Another major economic issue raising widespread local ire is the undercut-
ting of the market for local manufactured goods by the importation of
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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inexpensive products from China, particularly textiles.93 In 2004, shopkeepers in
Senegal protested against Chinese businesses, setting several on fire and
prompting the president to suspend virtually all further issuance of visas to Chi-
nese citizens.94 The closure of uncompetitive local textile mills in several African
countries, including Nigeria and South Africa, has incited protests and, in 2007,
prompted the South African president to warn that Africa was in danger of be-
coming a Chinese colony.95 Other economic complaints include the cancellation
of, or failure to complete, several major projects and concerns that construction
quality is not up to Western standards and may prove inadequate over time.96
Also, in 2006, Gabon suspended a Chinese firm’s oil drilling operations “due to
its environmentally unsafe practices.”97
Chinese military support to rogue regimes has also created friction between
China and several African countries. A shipment of arms and ammunition in-
tended for Zimbabwe in April 2008, in the midst of a disputed presidential elec-
tion in that country, met with “the refusal of dockworkers in South Africa to
offload the arms for overland shipment to Zimbabwe. The president of Zambia
publicly criticized the shipment while the governments of Mozambique,
Namibia, and Angola refused to allow the arms to be offloaded for transship-
ment to Harare.”98
With Chinese attention focused on African heads of government and the po-
litical and business elites that support them, China makes correspondingly “lit-
tle effort to cultivate Africans affiliated with civil society, labor unions,
non-governmental organizations, opposition political parties, etc.”99 By largely
isolating itself from local public opinion, China appears to exhibit a disregard
for its significance until damage has already occurred. Ironically, as noted
above, China is interested enough in public opinion to establish Confucius In-
stitutes throughout Africa to promote its worldview but not enough to make
an effort to understand public opinion before attempting to change it. Overall,
“China seems to have difficulty maneuvering in countries more democratic
than itself.”100 A prime example of this clumsiness is an assertion in the People’s
Daily of 30 December 2007 that Kenya was unsuitable for democracy and that
its imposition by colonial powers was to blame for the postelection violence in
that country—accusations immediately denounced by Kenyan media and
civic organizations.101 All of these diverse affronts to public opinion seriously
jeopardize the prestige and influence sought by China in Africa.
Perhaps the greatest contradiction between current activities and long-term
objectives lies in China’s exploitation of conflict and rogue regimes. Though
some observers claim, for example, that “China wants to keep political risks high
enough to ensure that Chevron, Total, and Shell—companies that once had
operations in Sudan—do not jump back in,” such instability precludes
H O F S T E D T 8 9
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development of a robust market for its own exports and ultimately threatens
Chinese investment and access to resources.102 Chinese oil facilities in both Ethi-
opia and Sudan have been attacked by rebel forces; the Justice and Equality
Movement in Sudan is specifically attempting to expel the Chinese for their sup-
port of the Sudanese government.103 Furthermore, activity perceived as perpetu-
ating or exacerbating instability diminishes China’s prestige both in Africa and
globally.
Also complicating a sustained prioritization of short-term political objec-
tives is the ever-broadening range of Chinese actors and interests involved in Af-
rica.104 Moreover, resolution of conflicts between these diverse groups,
particularly between government policy objectives and business profit incen-
tives, is hindered by bureaucratic barriers.105 In addition, direct government in-
fluence is waning, as “trade, investment, and other commercial activities
combined have outpaced official development assistance (ODA) and become
dominant in financial terms.”106 Despite an increase in annual ODA to Africa
from $310 million in 1989–92 to $1–$1.5 billion in 2004–2005, the ratio of ODA
to trade dropped from 20 percent to 3–4 percent over the same period.107 This
growth in trade and investment will create an increasingly powerful influence
favoring long-term political and economic stability over short-term political
opportunism.
Finally, successful economic growth and development, such as that fostered
by Chinese activities, effectively makes such African countries less beholden to
China. “Ironically, because of early help from the Chinese, Luanda may now
have the means to avoid getting trapped in a relationship with a partner as vora-
cious and demanding as China.”108 Moreover, African leaders are beginning to
exploit China, offering contracts to China not with any intention of fulfilling
them but rather to induce desired Western partners into offering more generous
terms.109 Niger, for example, successfully used such a strategy in negotiating ura-
nium rights with a French company.110
Exploitive economic practices that generate political opposition and diplo-
matic approaches that favor one country over the combined opposition of the
others in the region are clearly contrary to both the broad, stated objectives and
the more specific, deducible objectives of China in Africa. In fact, they jeopar-
dize China’s political influence and economic access. At the same time, barring
an event that generates a strong nationalistic response in China, the growing
economic influence of both Chinese businesses and recipient countries will in-
creasingly marginalize China’s ability to act for purely political purposes. This
fortuitous confluence of diverse factors creates a tremendous opportunity for
AFRICOM to leverage Chinese initiatives in the furtherance of its own
objectives.
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A RECOMMENDED AFRICOM RESPONSE
Most of the literature examining China’s involvement in Africa recommends co-
ordinating aid, training, and other forms of assistance between China and West-
ern donors so as to maximize its effectiveness in Africa. However, such
recommendations are merely theoretical, in that they fail to address complica-
tions associated with practical implementation; most of all, they do not consider
Chinese interests. Not only does the United States not control China, but it has
very little direct influence over China, since deference to U.S. interests would
undermine China’s highly prized autonomy and prestige. Potentially, direct
pressure applied to China could even be counterproductive, as China may feel
obligated to take an opposing stance so as to avoid even the appearance of acqui-
escence to U.S. demands.
Therefore, China must be indirectly influenced by shaping the environment
in such a way that its actions taken to advance its objectives simultaneously sup-
port American interests. Fortunately, a stable, secure Africa is in the long-term
best interest of not only the United States and Africa but China as well. Recent
political missteps aside, China’s attainment of its objectives in Africa ultimately
depends on a stable, secure environment for trade and the reliable flow of criti-
cal resources.
Consequently, Africa Command would do best not to oppose or undermine
Chinese activities in Africa. Pressuring countries to choose between the United
States and China would be a losing proposition: first, the United States would
not always win (and where the United States did not win, its influence would de-
cline precipitously, while that of China would rise proportionately); second,
where the United States did win, China would be encouraged to subvert the sys-
tem (if not the local political system, at least the existing international order);
and third, since many African states favor ties with both China and the United
States, such an action would create resentment and send the message that the
United States was not really interested in supporting Africa, only in countering
China, likely resulting in a sweeping reduction in U.S. influence across the conti-
nent.111 At the same time, any attempts to impede Chinese activities or access
would be seen by Beijing as highly threatening and would likely provoke it to
adopt a stance subversive of the established international order if not outright
hostile to the West. Conversely, because Chinese economic growth shows little,
or even negative, correlation with that of the United States (or of the West as a
whole), significant trade with both the United States and China could moderate
economic cycles in Africa, thereby improving economic stability and thus con-
tributing to political stability.112
Accordingly, even in cases of destructive or disruptive Chinese behavior,
AFRICOM would appear well advised to avoid confronting Chinese actors
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directly (particularly unilaterally) but rather to support the desired local re-
sponses of affected states and regional organizations. In other words, the most
fruitful approach for Africa Command would seem to be not attempting to in-
hibit China from taking actions that degrade China’s own influence and inter-
ests but in allowing them, while supporting the regional response to those
actions—without usurping local leadership or imposing narrow U.S. interests.
In the context of Africa, however, China has shown increasing willingness to
work with the international community. China has contributed to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund–sponsored African Capacity Building Foundation, and
in November 2004, it worked with the UN Development Program to establish
the China-Africa Business Council.113 Though China likely would not want to
work directly with the United States, or probably even the EU, because it would
not want to be (or be seen as) a junior partner, responsible Chinese initiatives
should be publicly praised and supported wherever possible. The greater China’s
incorporation into the international community, the less it will need to main-
tain ties with rogue regimes, the more it will see the value of complying with ac-
cepted norms of international behavior, the more it will benefit from a stable
international environment, and therefore the more likely that China will oppose
destabilizing activities, in its own interest. China would simply have no reason to
ignore or subvert an international system of which it was a major beneficiary
and on the verge of becoming a significant leader. With China embracing stabil-
ity, rogue African regimes will have few alternative sources of support and there-
fore experience greater pressure to reform. Recent moderation of Chinese
stances toward Sudan (including persuading the government to accept an ex-
panded UN presence and pressuring the government to alter its behavior and
negotiate a solution to the conflict in Darfur) and Zimbabwe (including prohib-
iting Robert Mugabe’s attendance at the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony and
pressuring him to negotiate with the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change) may indicate growing Chinese recognition of its evolving role in the in-
ternational community.114
The recent, well publicized deployment of Chinese warships to the Gulf of
Aden to counter the piracy threat, however, only superficially demonstrates par-
ticipation in multilateral approaches to Africa. Fundamentally, these operations
only tangentially address Africa’s problems; they primarily serve to help secure
Chinese commerce (primarily imports), though the Chinese warships have es-
corted, and responded to distress calls from, several foreign vessels.115 These op-
erations may also be reflective of both an emerging expeditionary capability and
growing fear of a burgeoning Indian sea-denial capability in the Indian
Ocean.116 Finally, while this deployment does indicate a willingness on the part
of China to take on new roles in the region, it also appears to indicate a
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preference for independent action vice incorporation into existing Western-
generated constructs, such as Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, with which the
Chinese exchange e-mail but have expressed no interest in joining.117 This is
consistent with both the value the Chinese place on autonomy and their desire
to eschew any position that could cause them to appear subordinate to the West.
Moreover, such a deployment enables China to demonstrate great-power status
and prestige through its willingness and ability to act unilaterally and operate
independently. Thus, China is unlikely to be particularly receptive to U.S. over-
tures for joint action.
There is, however, a potential exception: were the United States publicly to re-
quest that China take the lead on a particular issue of interest to Africa, China
would be under substantial pressure to do so. Such an approach could be politi-
cally palatable to China, since the United States would be publicly treating China
as a great-power peer vice a subordinate or a second-class power. More impor-
tant, Chinese refusal of such a request could be seen as an abdication of global
and regional leadership, as well as a lack of concern for Africa’s problems, result-
ing in a significant degradation in influence regionally and globally. Obviously,
this approach would have to be applied sparingly, so as to retain its impact and
prevent the appearance of American abdication of leadership.
Local threats to Chinese influence in Africa appear to have sparked in China
emerging recognition of the value of moderating its behavior toward the conti-
nent. In his February 2009 speech in Tanzania, President Hu declared, “The Chi-
nese government encourages and supports the competitive Chinese businesses
to invest in Africa, create more jobs for the local people, increase technology
transfer to the continent and urge[s] them to shoulder greater social responsi-
bilities and live in harmony with local communities.”118 Diplomatically, growing
realization of the threat to its economic interests, combined with international
pressure, particularly from the AU and Chad, convinced China essentially to
play the “good cop” to the rest of the world’s “bad cop” toward Sudan.119 This ap-
proach earned China praise from Andrew S. Natsios, former U.S. special envoy
to Sudan, and Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and
proved broadly advantageous to China: “It increased its moral influence, reas-
sured its partners in Africa and the West, safeguarded its oil empire in Sudan and
uphold [sic] its prerequisite of sovereignty and state consent.”120 Similarly, it was
African pressure (especially from Ethiopia) that prompted China to propose a
peacekeeping mission in Somalia to the UN Security Council in 2006.121 China,
declared President Hu in his Tanzanian speech, will “play a constructive role of
settling conflicts and hot issues and maintaining peace and security in Africa.”122
Of course, there is no guarantee China will act in its own long-term best in-
terest. However, should China refuse to remain productively engaged in Africa,
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it will likely forfeit prior investment; jeopardize its own export market; betray its
indifference to the states and people of Africa, costing itself international sup-
port; and effectively hand regional leadership to the West. The resulting sacrifice
of economic strength and global prestige would be a considerable loss for China,
and in that regard it may well serve as an incentive for China to continue along
its current path of increasingly productive involvement.
Supporting responsible Chinese initiatives in Africa, however, does not mean
abdicating theater leadership to China. Africa Command can actively promote
American influence by demonstrating the benefits of American goodwill at the
continental, regional, national, and local levels. Instead of previous approaches
that alienated Africa by narrowly emphasizing counterterrorism and democracy
building at the expense of local needs, recognition of the common long-term
objectives of stability and security would further the AFRICOM mission while
bolstering the American reputation in Africa by focusing on Africa’s own priori-
ties.123 For example, the African Union’s need for training, equipment, and fi-
nancing is substantial, between its “massively under-resourced” Peace and
Security Council and its request for international support to “stand up” an Af-
rican Stand-by Force (“five regional brigades with rapid deployment capabil-
ity”).124 Africa Command can provide or arrange for this support, possibly
through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance pro-
gram (ACOTA).125
Africa Command should also push to have administration of ACOTA trans-
ferred from the State Department Bureau of African Affairs. Replacing the current
State Department civilian-contractor training staff with AFRICOM military per-
sonnel would not only allow continued training in peace enforcement and coun-
terinsurgency skills but would also provide additional avenues for advancing U.S.
security interests in Africa. In particular, this expanded military-to-military con-
tact could be employed to enhance local military professionalism (with special
emphasis in the areas of ethics, international law, and respect for civilian author-
ity) and to develop rapport, cultivating positive, productive, and lasting working
relationships with U.S. military personnel.126 AFRICOM should then actively
maintain these relationships to evaluate the effectiveness of the training pro-
vided and identify measures to improve its training program, to recognize when
additional specialized training might be beneficial, and to facilitate coordina-
tion between AFRICOM and local military forces during a domestic crisis or
regional peacekeeping operation (whether the United States is formally partic-
ipating or not).127 This broadened engagement would better improve African
operational effectiveness and military professionalism while enhancing
AFRICOM’s credibility and influence.
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Though extensive formal collaboration with China is unlikely, at least over
the near term, Africa Command should attempt to work closely with all the
other major actors in Africa. First of all, the command should leverage its Euro-
pean Command origins to facilitate coordination with EU initiatives and
thereby garner European support while improving effectiveness and preventing
redundancy. Second, AFRICOM should develop mechanisms to allow effective
coordination with—and support for—both UN institutions and UN peace-
keeping missions in Africa, whether or not the United States is formally partici-
pating in any particular program or mission. This could help improve UN
effectiveness while increasing international support for AFRICOM. Third, Af-
rica Command should request a permanent AU presence at AFRICOM head-
quarters to improve coordination, bolster AU credibility, and strengthen the
command’s legitimacy in the eyes of Africans. Fourth, Africa Command should
meaningfully engage all the countries of Africa, not just those generating media
coverage, with special attention paid to those in which the United States does
not maintain an embassy, including Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Comoros, and
São Tomé and Príncipe.128 Since traditionally U.S. diplomatic engagement in Af-
rica has been highly selective, more broadly based engagement could help allevi-
ate lingering concerns over U.S. intentions and prior self-serving policies.129
Fifth, Africa Command should proactively engage—and attempt to work
with—other countries expanding their presence in Africa, including India, Rus-
sia, and Brazil, to foster their stable, efficient integration while attempting to
prevent future sources of conflict. Finally, Africa Command should indicate its
receptiveness to working with China if and when China decides to do so. Positive
Chinese relationships with the U.S. Coast Guard and the United Kingdom’s De-
partment for International Development could allow these organizations to
serve as conduits by which AFRICOM could engage China and eventually help
build upon the very limited collaboration demonstrated in Liberia, Ethiopia,
and the Gulf of Aden.130
In addition, Africa Command can mobilize interagency support for African
efforts to improve economic and political governance, such as the New Eco-
nomic Partnership for Africa’s Development, the African Peer Review Mecha-
nism, and the West African Civil Society Forum.131 AFRICOM should
proactively assist in the implementation of recommendations from these civil
organizations wherever possible—without attempting to insert itself into the
decision-making process. Promotion of such governance initiatives would serve
the dual purpose of promoting long-term social and political stability while si-
multaneously countering the effect of Chinese support for authoritarian or cor-
rupt regimes.
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Another crucial area of African need is medical care. AIDS is a major focus of
the South African Development Community, and AIDS and infectious diseases
have been identified by Africans in polls as the “leading global threat.”132 There
are an estimated twenty-five million HIV-infected people in Africa, represent-
ing 7.5 percent of fifteen-to-forty-nine-year-olds.133 The majority of those dying
from HIV-related diseases are “between 20 and 50 years of age, the most impor-
tant group for a well-functioning economy, polity and society.”134 A conservative
estimate places economic losses from HIV/AIDS at 2.6 percent of gross domes-
tic product annually.135 The greatest mortality, however, is from malaria, which
kills an average of three thousand Africans every day.136 AFRICOM would be
well advised to redouble the efforts of military medical teams and interagency
groups to address these issues. Simply making inexpensive family-planning op-
tions widely available could help limit the spread of HIV/AIDS while simulta-
neously contributing to controlling population growth and eventually
eliminating the youth bulge.137 This assistance would be particularly appreciated
in the region if anticipated economic and demographic changes in China curtail
the future availability of that nation’s medical teams.138
These represent only a few examples of innumerable pressing African needs
that can be at least partially addressed by Africa Command. The specific needs
themselves, however, are not as important as the fact that AFRICOM would be
advancing the common long-term objective of stability and security in Africa by
responding to Africa’s needs instead of narrowly promoting a U.S. agenda. By
approaching our common objective from the African perspective vice our own,
we demonstrate our goodwill toward the region and ultimately encourage the
states and organizations of Africa to prefer the United States to China as a
partner.
The fact that a stable and secure African environment is in the long-term best
interest of the United States, Africa, and China means that AFRICOM can en-
hance U.S. influence in Africa while promoting U.S. objectives by actively sup-
porting African interests, including those that involve Chinese economic
development activities. Consequently, Africa Command should support pro-
ductive, responsible behavior on the part of China in Africa, taking care neither
to impede nor co-opt Chinese endeavors that further long-term American ob-
jectives in Africa.
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